Should this matter proceed to trial, the United States would prove the following beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. In October 1981, defendant RONALD N. MONTAPERTO began employment with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in Arlington, Virginia as an intelligence analyst on issues pertaining the People's Republic of China (PRC). He held a Top Secret security clearance. On October 2, 1981, MONTAPERTO signed a DIA Secrecy Agreement by which he acknowledged that he would never divulge any classified information relating to the national security without prior consent of the Director of the DIA or his designated representative.
MONTAPERTO further acknowledged that he was responsible for ascertaining whether information was classified and who was authorized to receive it. MONTAPERTO acknowledged that he had read and understood the provisions of the Espionage Act, including Title 18, United States Code, Sections 793, 794 and 798.1 expected to cause damage to national security.
2. In 1983, MONTAPERTO was reassigned by the DIA to work as Chief, Current Intelligence, China Branch, at the Pentagon in Arlington. From July 1986 to February 1992, he was assigned by the DIA to work at the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC) at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, D.C.
3. In February 1992, MONTAPERTO began working at the Institute of National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University (NDU) in Washington, D.C. In March 2001, he was hired as the Dean of Academics at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS), in Honolulu, Hawaii. APCSS is a Department of Defense (DOD) educational institution in which civilian and military security professionals from the various nations of the Asia-Pacific Region and the United States study issues and problems related to Asian security.
4. As part of his responsibilities as a PRC analyst at the DIA, MONTAPERTO was among five or six DIA analysts selected in 1982 to participate in a pilot program initiated by the DIA to foster social and professional interaction between DIA's PRC experts and the PRC military attachés assigned to the PRC Embassy in Washington, D.C. All contacts between DIA participants and the PRC military attachés were to be documented. None of the DIA participants was authorized to disseminate classified information to the PRC military attachés. By 1984, when MONTAPERTO was working at the Pentagon, all the other participants in the pilot program had either retired or transferred. MONTAPERTO continued to maintain contact with the PRC military attachés as part of his official responsibilities, yet failed to execute contact reports after each meeting as required by DIA regulations. He did file an official "assessment" of each of the two PRC military attachés with whom he was primarily meeting - one was filed in October 1983, the other in May 1987. He only filed these two assessments after being directed to do so by DIA security. He then submitted additional assessments in 1988. On occasion, MONTAPERTO discussed with his superiors his meetings with the military attachés, and, by early 1989, he was directed by his immediate supervisor to discontinue his meetings with the military attachés altogether.
5. In 1988, MONTAPERTO applied for a position as a DIA analyst detailed to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). During security processing in January 1989, MONTAPERTO made the following admissions: a) in 1982, he separately showed both his father and his wife (neither of whom held a security clearance) a classified document (level unknown); b) in 1982, he removed a Confidential U.S. government document from its proper place of storage and brought it home; c) in 1987, he invited into the DIAC, without authorization, a private researcher (who, further investigation revealed, was uncleared and had been given access to classified information by Montaperto); and d) in 1988, he removed and brought home a Secret document. He also admitted to maintaining contact with PRC military attaché Yu Zenghe and his predecessor. MONTAPERTO was not able to successfully complete security processing at the CIA and was not offered the position he was seeking at that agency. However, his DIA clearances remained in place and no effort was made to restrict his access to classified information.
6. On January 29, February 6, February 13, and February 20, 1991, FBI agents interviewed MONTAPERTO about his relationship with the PRC attachés. MONTAPERTO stated that he had developed close relationships with at least two of the attachés - Senior Colonels Yang Qiming and Yu Zenghe. Investigation by the FBI has determined that both men were intelligence officers for the PRC during the time of MONTAPERTO's association with them. MONTAPERTO admitted to verbally providing these attachés a considerable amount of information that was useful to them, including classified information. However, MONTAPERTO stated he could not recall specifically what classified information he had disclosed to the attachés, and the investigation was closed by the FBI without referral for a prosecutive opinion.
7. In August 2001, a joint Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) and FBI investigation was initiated on MONTAPERTO in Honolulu, Hawaii. As part of the investigation, a ruse was established in which a U.S. military representative approached MONTAPERTO in July 2003 and asked him whether he would be interested in working on a sensitive project on China. In accordance with the ruse, MONTAPERTO was told that he would have to submit to a counterintelligence polygraph examination administered by the NCIS as a prerequisite to working on this special project. MONTAPERTO volunteered to do so.
8. In two pre-polygraph interviews conducted by NCIS agents in October 2003, MONTAPERTO admitted the following: a) he met with PRC military attachés Yang Qiming and Yu Zenghe, individually, from 1983 to 1990; b) he knew when he met with the two attachés that both were trained intelligence officers; c) he would often discuss classified issues with the attachés by talking "around" the information; and d) he had verbally disclosed to Yu Zenghe information classified by the U.S. government at the Secret and Top Secret levels (although he stated he could not recall specifically what classified information he had disclosed to Yu Zenghe). Additionally, MONTAPERTO stated that he might have a document either at his residence or his office in Honolulu, Hawaii, or at his townhouse in Springfield, Virginia, which MONTAPERTO had written based on a conversation he had had with Yang Qiming.
MONTAPERTO stated that this document pertained to relations between the United States government and the PRC and that he believed he had placed the document in question in a book. He provided the NCIS with consent to search his residence, vehicle, and office in Hawaii, as well as his residence in Springfield. Consequently, after the October interviews were completed, NCIS agents conducted searches of the locations in Honolulu. No document of the sort described by MONTAPERTO was found.
9. When NCIS agents arrived at MONTAPERTO's Springfield, Virginia townhouse on November 12, 2003 to conduct a search, MONTAPERTO's wife directed the agents to a large bookshelf containing numerous books in a second floor office. The agents did not find any document of the sort described by MONTAPERTO or any other related evidence during the search of those books.
10. On November 19, 2003, NCIS agents conducted a third pre-polygraph examination interview of MONTAPERTO in Honolulu. MONTAPERTO stated that during the late 1980's, he had two discussions with Yu Zenghe involving Top Secret information. One disclosure dealt with the sale of military equipment by the PRC to a Middle Eastern country.
MONTAPERTO identified the specific type of equipment and the country that purchased the equipment. The second Top Secret discussion dealt with the sale of missiles from the PRC to another Middle Eastern country. MONTAPERTO stated he could not recall specifically what he had disclosed to Yu Zenghe with respect to these sales. Although some information about these sales was officially available to the public, MONTAPERTO's knowledge on this topic was derived from highly classified sources and sensitive compartmented information. Pursuant to his secrecy agreement with the government, MONTAPERTO had a legal duty to confirm that any such derived information was releasable, yet he failed to do so.
11. On December 3, 2003, the FBI conducted a final interview of MONTAPERTO in Honolulu. During this interview, MONTAPERTO elaborated on admissions he had made in previous interviews about having disclosed classified information to PRC military attachés in the 1980's. He also stated that from 1989 to 2001 he continued to meet with PRC military attachés from the PRC Embassy. MONTAPERTO named several attachés, all of whom were determined by the FBI to be PRC intelligence officers who worked within the United States.
MONTAPERTO admitted he may have orally disclosed classified information that he recollected from his previous position to PRC military attachés as late as 2001. However, during this interview, MONTAPERTO stated he could not recall specifically what classified information he had disclosed to the attachés.
12. On February 4, 2004, FBI agents executed a search warrant issued by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia at MONTAPERTO's residence at 7936 Birchtree Court, Springfield, Virginia. At this time, MONTAPERTO had stored within a file cabinet drawer in his basement a number of classified documents, six of which contained national defense information classified at the Secret level and clearly marked as such. These documents consisted of: three February 1984 DIA memoranda regarding "Future PRC Relationship," "Future DIA-PRC Relationship,"and "A Plan for DIA-PRC Relationship;" a February 1984 DOD cable regarding "The Maturing US/PRC Military Relationship;" and two July 1988 DIA memoranda regarding "Policy Regarding Contact with Chinese Nationals."
MONTAPERTO had previously removed these documents from their proper place of storage within the DOD. As MONTAPERTO well knew, he was not authorized to store or retain classified materials at his residence.
13. A July 2005 paragraph-by-paragraph analysis by the DIA of the previouslydescribed Secret documents seized from MONTAPERTO's townhouse determined that all of these documents were properly classified at the time they were created and that all retained their Secret classification at the time of this analysis.
14. At all times during the above-described incidents, defendant MONTAPERTO acted unlawfully and knowingly and not by mistake or other innocent reason.Respectfully submitted,
After consulting with my attorney and pursuant to the plea agreement entered into this day between the defendant, RONALD N. MONTAPERTO, and the United States, I hereby stipulate that the above Statement of Facts is true and accurate, and that had the matter proceeded to trial, the United States would have proved the same beyond a reasonable doubt.
I am RONALD N. MONTAPERTO's attorney. I have carefully reviewed the above Statement of Facts with him. To my knowledge, his decision to stipulate to these facts is an informed and voluntary one.