THE SECRET FILES OF RON BROWN


UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Export Administration
Washington, D.C. 20230



August 12, 1997

Mr. Charles R. Smith
SOFTWAR
7707 Whirlaway Drive
Midlothian, VA 23112

Dear Mr. Smith:

This is a supplement to my March 4, 1997 letter to you, which responded to your January 1, 1997, request under the Freedom of Information Act for certain documents related to encryption, including data provided to Ronald Brown on encryption policy. I stated in that earlier letter that we were referring two documents to the originating agencies for their review and determination on releasability.

We are now able to release a redacted version of one of those two documents and you will find it enclosed. As indicated, the redacted portions contain information properly classified under Executive Order 12958 and exempt from disclosure under Executive Order 5 U.S.C. 552 (b) (1996 Supp. 1997), which authorizes withholding information specifically specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order, or withheld under 5 U.S.C. 552 (b) (2), which allows withholding of information that relates solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency.

This is the initial determination for your request. You have the right to appeal administratively the denial of any records withheld within thirty days of the date of this letter. If you decide to file an appeal, address it to the General Counsel, U.S. Department of Commerce, room H5883, Washington, DC 20230. Include a copy of your request, the initial denial, a statement of why the initial determination was in error. Both the appeal letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal".

Sincerely yours,

James A. Lewis
Director
Office of Strategic Trade and
Foreign Policy Controls

Enclosures

FOI97-3



*** PLEASE NOTE *** PORTIONS REDACTED (CENSORED) ARE REPRESENTED BY XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

SECRET

SECRET                                                            20322

                               THE WHITE HOUSE

                                 WASHINGTON

                                APRIL 16, 1993


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MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
               THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
               THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
               THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
               THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET
               THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
               THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
               THE DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
               THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

SUBJECT:       Advanced Telecommunications and Encryption (U)


New developments in telecommunications hold great promise for
the American economy - its productivity and global
competitiveness.  But they also pose risks to the government's
ability to enforce laws and protect national security.  We must,
with some urgency, find new ways to accommodate the government's
interests in law enforcement, privacy, national security,
productivity and competitiveness.  (U)

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BACKGROUND

The Clinton Administration is committed to the development of an
information superhighway and National Information Infrastructure
that depends on a developing synergy between telecommunications
and computer technologies.  Rapid changes in both the
telecommunications and computer industries have blurred the
traditional gaps that seperated these technologies.  The result
of these changes has significantly improved both our
telecommunications infrastructure and computational capability.
(U)


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At the same time many of the technologies that facilitate rapid
implementation of these advanced information systems inhibit
lawfully authorized electronic surveillance by government
agencies.  For example, some advanced telecommunications that
form the backbone of the information superhighway also nullify
the effectiveness of traditional methods of carrying out court
authorized wiretaps.  The encryption technologies that can be
used to protect privacy and business data can also be used by
lawbreakers to prevent the government from obtaining contents of
information it is authorized to intercept.  (U)

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PART I:  ASSESSMENT

Telecommunications Technologies

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2.  What is the impact, including risks and opportunites, of
advances in telecommunications services on:

      a.    federal, state and local law enforcement capabilites
            and performance (including public safety);

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      c.    privacy and security of personal, commercial and 
            government information in the U.S. and abroad;  (U)

      d.    U.S. commercial competitiveness?  (U)


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Encryption Technologies 3. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXX P A R A G R A P H W I T H H E L D XXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX SECRET IN THE INTEREST OF NATIONAL DEFENSE XXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX SECRET SECRET SECRET SECRET XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 4. What is the impact, including risks and opportunities, of advances in encryption technologies on: a. federal, state and local law enforcement capabilites and performance (including public safety); b. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX c. privacy and security of personal, commercial and government information in the U.S. and abroad; (U) d. U.S. commercial competitiveness; (U) e. the security and reliability of the telecommunications network. (U) Key Escrow Technique for Encryption 5. What are the uses, domestic and foreign, of the key-escrow technology developed by the government in software, hardware and telecommunications applications? Access the relative practicality of voluntary versus manditory uses of this approach? What are the reactions of industry to this approach? What reactions to this encryption approach might be expected from foreign manufacturers and governments? For domestic and foreign licensing of the technology? What institutional agents are feasible for key-escrow safekeeping. (U) 6. Are there unacceptable risks that the key-escrow technique may be readily disable when implemented in software encryption products? If so, what other possible solutions might assure authorized government access to information protected by software encryption and still afford reasonable encryption protection to software end users? 7. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX SECRET

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XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Export Controls 8. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXX P A R A G R A P H W I T H H E L D XXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX SECRET IN THE INTEREST OF NATIONAL DEFENSE XXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX SECRET SECRET SECRET SECRET XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX PART II: OPTIONS XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXX P A R A G R A P H W I T H H E L D XXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX SECRET IN THE INTEREST OF NATIONAL DEFENSE XXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX SECRET SECRET SECRET SECRET XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX The following should guide the development of the options: - - Whether and in what circumstances legislation or other regulation of encryption and advanced telecommunications is warranted; (U) - - Whether these issues can be accommodated through (1) cooperative arrangements with manufacturers and telecommunications service providers and those who manufacture and offer encryption services; (2) alternative investigative/collection techniques; (3) technological innovation; (4) international agreements/arrangements; and (5) adjustments to domestic and international standards (U) In developing these options, their costs should be provided along with likely reactions of industry, the Congress, foreign manufacturers and governments, and those entities affected by the recommended option. Recommended implementing strategies should be provided. (U) SECRET

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PART III: TASKING An IWG will be established by the NSC that will include representatives from all cognizant agencies. The IWG will ensure that there are early and frequent consultations with industry throughout the course of this review, subject to appropriate protection of classified information. (U) Anthony Lake Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
SECRET NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL LOG 9320322 DISTRIBUTIONS RECEIPT DATE 16 APR 93 SUBJECT: PRD-27 DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: SECRET EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: DATE TIME SIGNATURE MR. ALBERT GORE, JR ________ ________ ______________ VICE PRESIDENT VIA ROOM 290 COPY: #1 OLD EXECUTIVE OFC BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20500 MR. LES ASPIN ________ ________ ______________ DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE VIA EXECUTIVE SECRETARY COPY: #2 ROOM 3E330 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC MS. JANET RENO ________ ________ ______________ DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE VIA JUSTICE SECURITY STAFF COPY: #3 ROOM 5214, MAIN JUSTICE 10TH & CONSTITUTION AVE, NW WASHINGTON, DC MR. RONALD R. BROWN ________ ________ ______________ DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE VIA CHIEF OF STAFF COPY: #4 ROOM 5422 14TH & CONSTITUTION AVE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20230 MR. LEON PANETTA ________ ________ ______________ OFC OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET VIA ROOM 238 COPY: #5 OLD EXECUTIVE OFC BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503 MR. ROBERT E. RUBIN ________ ________ ______________ NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL VIA ROOM 231 COPY: #6 OLD EXECUTIVE OFC BLDG ATTN: BO CUTTER DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC, ROOM 379 OEOB PAGE 01 OF 02 PAGES
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20230


AUG 19 1997

Mr. Charles R. Smith
SOFTWAR
7707 Whirlaway Drive
Midlothian, VA 23112

Dear Mr. Smith:

This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of February 19, 1997, requesting:

  "-All data provided to and/or about Benard Nussbaum, Webb
   Hubbell,John Huang, Moctar or James Riady, Ronald Brown,
   and/or Vince Foster in association with project Clipper,
   encryption software, legislation on encryption software,
   policy and contractual arrangements.  Specifically, Clipper
   algorithm information provided, policy and/or briefing papers
   in connection with encryption software.
   - Information on financial donations, meetings, negotiations,
   and policy decisions in reference to missile, computer, and
   encryption technology transfer to China military agencies as
   illustrated in GAO report NSIAD-97-5.
   - All information on contracts, negotiations or contacts
   between Alltel Inc.  (formally Systematics of Arkansas), and
   or the Rose Office Law firm with the Federal Bureau of
   Investigation.
   - All data on contacts between Vince Foster, Ron Brown, Webb
   Hubbell, and/or Benard Nussbaum with any foreign agents or
   citizens possibly acting as agents for another nation."

We are enclosing responsive documents to your request which are either not subject to exemption from release under the FOIA or for which the Department has made a discretionary disclosure.

Ten documents are being withheld in whole pursuant to 5 USC 552 (b) (3).

  5 USC 552 (b) (3) exempts matters that are specifically
  exempted from disclosure by statute..., provided that such
  statute ... (B) establishes particular criteria for
  withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be
  withheld. 

  The statutory provision that establishes the criteria for
  withholding this information is Section 12 (c) of the Export
  Administration Act of 1979, as amended, which states in 
  pertinent part:

         Information obtained under this Act after June 30,
         1980, may be withheld only to the extent permitted by
         statute, except that information obtained for the 
         purpose of consideration of, or concerning license
         applications under that Act shall be withheld from
         public disclosure unless the release of such
         information is determined by the Secretary to be
         in the national interest.

  50 USC app. 2411(c) (1994).  See also 15 CFR 790.4.

  The authority provided by Section 12(c) is supplemented by
  the authority contained in a combination of the 
  International Emergency Economic Power Act (50 USCA 1701 -
  1706 (1994)), Executive Order 12924 of August 19, 1994 (59
  Fed. Reg. 43437, August 23, 1994), as extended by
  Presidential Notice on August 15, 1995 (60 FR 42767, August
  17, 1995) and August 14, 1996 (61 FR 42527, August 15,
  1996), and the Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR
  768-799 (1996)).

  Consistent with the provisions of Section 12(c) of the Act,
  and in the absence of a national interest determination
  authorizing the release of the information, it must be
  denied.

Those portions of documents which are not responsive to your request are marked N/R.

One document is a predecisional document and is being withheld under exemption (b) (5).

Pursuant to Department of Commerce regulation (15 CFR 4.6 (a) (4)), two documents have referred to their originating agency for consultation about their releaseability. We will inform you of our decision with respect to these documents after we finish our consultation.

You have a right to appeal this partial denial of your request within 30 days of the date of this letter. Any appeal should be addressed to the Assistant General Counsel for Administration, Room 5898-C, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th and Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20230. Any appeal should include a copy of the original request, this response, and a statement of the reasons why this response is in error. Both the appeal letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal."

Sincerely,

Bettie Baca
Executive Secretary

Enclosures



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