United States
General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and
International Affairs Division


June 16,1998

The Honorable James Saxton
Chairman, Joint Economic Committee
United States Senate

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In June 1989, the United States and the members of the European
Union embargoed the sale of military items to China to protest
China's massacre of demonstrators in Beijing's Tiananmen Square.
You have expressed concern regarding continued Chinese access to
foreign technology over the past decade, despite these
embargoes. As requested, we identified (1) the terms of the EU
embargo and the extent of EU military sales to China since 1989,
(2) the terms of the U.S. embargo and the extent of U.S.
military sales to China since 1989, and (3) the potential role
that such EU and U.S. sales could play in addressing China's
defense needs. In conducting this review, we focused on military
items--items that would be included on the U.S. Munitions List.
This list includes both lethal items (such as missiles) and
nonlethal items (such as military radars) that cannot be
exported without a license.2 Because the data in this report was
developed from unclassified sources, its completeness and
accuracy may be subject to some uncertainty.


The context for China's foreign military imports during the
1990s lies in China's recent military modernization efforts.3
Until the mid- 1980s, China's military doctrine focused on
defeating technologically superior invading forces by trading
territory for time and employing China's vast reserves of
manpower. In 1985, China adopted a new military doctrine that
emphasizes the use of modern naval and air power in joint
offensive operations against regional opponents. Lacking
equipment needed to implement its new doctrine, China began
buying small amounts of military items from other nations,
including the United States and some European
1 In 1989, the European Union--then known as the European
Community--consisted of Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, and the United Kingdom. Austria, Finland, and Sweden
became EU members in 1995.

2 We did not address exports of items with both civil and
military applications because the embargoes do not bar the
export of dual-use items. Experts believe that such items are an
important source of high technology for China's military.

3 This report does not assess China's military modernization
efforts. For a fuller discussion of them, see our report
entitled National Security: Impact of China's Military
Modernization in the Pacific Region GAO/NSIAD-95-84, June
6, 1995).

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GAO/NSIAD-98-176 China


nations. However, the 1989 massacre of demonstrators in
Tiananmen Square led to the imposition of the U.S. and EU arms
embargoes--disrupting China's access to these sources of modern
military technology.

Results in Brief

The Eu embargo is based on a 1989 political declaration that Eu
members will embargo the "trade in arms" with China. Each EU
member may interpret and implement the embargo's scope for
itself. We found no cases of EU members entering into new
agreements to sell China lethal military items after 1989,
although some members delivered lethal and nonlethal military
items to China during the 1990s--apparently in connection with
preembargo agreements--and have more recently agreed to deliver
additional nonlethal military items. According to experts, the
embargo is not legally binding and any EU member could legally
resume arms sales to China if it were willing to bear the
political consequences of doing so. At least two EU members are
now considering whether the embargo should continue.

In contrast to the Eu embargo, the U.S. embargo is enacted in
law and bars the sale to China of all military items--lethal and
nonlethal--on the U.S.  Munitions List. The President may waive
this ban if he believes that doing so is in the national
interest. Since 1989, he has issued waivers to (1) allow the
delivery to China of military items valued at $36.3 million to
close out the U.S. government's pre-1989 defense agreements with
China and (2) license commercial military exports valued at
about $313 million--primarily commercial satellite and
encryption items. Recent U.S. executive branch actions suggest
that its view of China's human rights record--the basis for the
embargo in the first place--may be changing.  Erosion of the EU
embargo may also raise questions regarding the future of the
U.S. embargo.

The rather small amount of EU and U.S. sales of military items
to China since 1989 could help address some aspects of China's
defense needs; however, their importance to China's
modernization goal may be relatively limited because Russia and
the Middle East have provided almost 90 percent of China's
imported military items during this period.  According to
experts with whom we spoke, China must overcome obstacles posed
by its military's command and control, training, and maintenance
processes before it can fully exploit such items.

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EU Military Exports
to China Have Been

In reaction to the Tiananmen Square massacre, the European
Council--an EU decision-making body comprised of ministers from
EU member countries--imposed several sanctions in June 1989,
including "an embargo on trade in arms with China." However,
according to experts, the Council's declaration was not legally
binding. It also did not specify the embargo's scope. For
example, it did not state whether the embargo covers all
military articles, including weapons platforms, nonlethal
military items, or components.

Interpretation of Embargo Left to Members

EU and other European officials told us that the European Union
has left the interpretation and enforcement of the declaration
to its individual member states4 and that the members have
interpreted the embargo's scope in different ways. Officials in
some EU nations informed us that their nations have embargoed
the sale of virtually all military items to China. In contrast,
the United Kingdom's interpretation of the EU embargo does not
bar exports of nonlethal military items, such as avionics and
radars. The UK embargo is limited to lethal weapons (such as
bombs and torpedoes), specially designed components of lethal
weapons, ammunition, military aircraft and helicopters,
warships, and equipment likely to be used for internal
repression. European and EU officials told us that EU members
tried during the early 1990s to develop a detailed Eu-wide
interpretation of the embargo's scope. These attempts apparently
fell short and resulted only in the members' mutual recognition
that they were not selling China lethal weapons.

According to EU and European officials, the EU embargo could be
formally ended by unanimous consent or informally eroded by
individual EU members' resumption of military trade with China.
EU members, whose defense firms are faced with severe economic
pressures, could move to modify their participation in the
embargo if they believe China's human rights situation is
improving. A recent EU report noted that human rights in China,
while still far from meeting international standards, had
improved over the past 20 years. There have been signs that some
Eu members have sought to increase military sales to China. We
found that at least two EU members--Italy and Spain--are now
reassessing whether the embargo should be continued.


4 EU officials informed us that this reliance on the EU members
reflects the members' independence in defense matters.

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EU Sales of Military Items
to China Since 1989

No EU members appear to have concluded new agreements to sell
lethal weapons to China since the imposition of the Eu embargo.
As shown in table 1, three EU members have delivered, or agreed
to deliver, military items to China since.1989.5

Table 1: EU Military Items Delivered to China, 1990-97

Country and System                             Lethal Date

Castor-2B naval fire control radar             No     Pre-1989
Crotale ship-to-air missiles and launcher      Yes    Pre-1989
TAVITAC naval combat automation system         No     Pre-1989
Sea Tiger naval surveillance radar             No     Pre-1989
AS-365N Dauphin-2 helicopter                   No     Pre-1989
SA-321 Super Frelon helicopter                 No     Pre-1989

Aspide air-to-air missile                      Yes    1989 a
Electronic countermeasures for A-SM            No     Pre-1989
Radar for F-TM and F-7MP fighters              No     1993

United Kingdom
Avionics for F-7M fighter                      No     1989 b
Searchwater airborne early warning radar       No     1996
(no deliveries to date)


a According to the source of the information, this agreement's
exact date is unclear.

b This agreement appears to have been concluded prior to June

Sources: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, other
public sources.

Two EU member states delivered lethal weapons to China after the
embargo, according to publicly available sources of information.
These deliveries--French Crotale ship-to-air missiles and
Italian Aspide air-to-air missiles--appear to have been made in
connection with preembargo agreements. Similarly,
French-licensed Chinese helicopter production, which continued
into the 1990s, began prior to 1989. Also, the United Kingdom
honored a preembargo agreement by providing China with radars,
displays, and other avionics for its F-TM fighter aircraft.

During the 1990s, Italy and the United Kingdom agreed to sell
nonlethal military items to China. Italy agreed to sell fire
control radars for use on Chinese F-TM and F-TMP export
fighters. The United Kingdom agreed to sell China the
Searchwater airborne early warning radar system. UK officials
informed us that the decision to do so is consistent with the UK
interpretation of the Eu embargo, in that the Searchwater is not
a lethal weapon or a weapons platform.


5 See appendix 1 for a brief description of these items.

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Waivers Have Allowed Exports of Some U.S.  Military Items to

On June 5, 1989, immediately after the massacre of prodemocracy
demonstrators at Tiananmen Square, the President announced
sanctions on China to protest its actions. In February 1990,
Congress codified the sanctions' prohibition on weapon sales in
Public Law 101-246. The law suspended the issuance of licenses
for the export to China of any defense article on the U.S.
Munitions List. It exempted from this prohibition U.S.
Munitions List items that are designed specifically for use in
civil products (such as internal navigation equipment for
commercial airliners) unless the President determines the end
user will be the Chinese military. The law also specifically
barred the export of U.S.-origin satellites for launch on
Chinese launch vehicles. Because the U.S. Munitions List
includes nonlethal military equipment (for example, radios and
radars) in addition to lethal equipment (such as missiles), the
U.S. prohibition on arms sales to China covers a broader range
of items than the EU embargo, as implemented.6

Under the law, these items may be exported to China if the
President reports to Congress that it is in the national
interest to terminate a suspension.7 Under this authority,
Presidents Bush and Clinton have issued waivers for exports of
Munitions List and satellite equipment to China based on
determinations that doing so was in the national interests.

Recent U:S. executive branch actions suggest that its position
on China's human rights record may be changing. For the first
time in several years, the United States recently decided
against sponsoring a United Nations resolution condemning
China's human rights. Such a shift could have an impact on
implementation of the U.S. embargo, which resulted from China's
human rights abuses. According to press reports, the executive
branch has recently considered easing restrictions on commercial
satellite projects in China--in part through the use of blanket

Sales of Munitions List Items to China Since 1989

The United States has delivered or licensed for export to China
almost $350 million in Munitions List equipment since 1990.
These exports were made through (1) government-to-government
agreements managed by the


6 The Munitions List can also include dual-use items if they are
specifically designed, developed, configured, adapted, or
modified for military application and have significant military
or intelligence applicability requiring that they be controlled
as munitions.

7 The law also allows the President to lift the sanctions if he
reports to Congress that China has made progress on a program of
political reform covering a range of issues, including human

8 Since 1990, many items once controlled on the Munitions List
have been moved to Commerce Department control and are therefore
no longer subject to U.S. sanctions barring their export to
China.  In 1992, many items were moved to Commerce's control as
part of a larger rationalization process.

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Government-to -Government Sales

Department of Defense (DOD) under the Foreign Military Sales
Program and (2) commercial exports licensed by the State
Department, the majority of which were related to launches of
U.S.-origin satellites in China. All were authorized under
presidential waivers declaring the export to be in the national
interest or were specifically exempted from the sanctions under
the law.

In December 1992, President Bush issued a waiver stating that it
was in the national interest to allow the export of military
equipment in order to close out four government-to-government
military assistance programs that had been suspended by the
sanctions. The waiver stated that these deliveries would not
significantly contribute to China's military capability and
closing these cases would improve the prospects for gaining
further cooperation from China on nonproliferation issues. The
total value of these exports, shown in table 2, was about $36.3

Table 2: U.S. Government Exports of Munitions Items to China,

Dollars in millions

Program               Purpose                      Deliveries
Peace Pearl (F-8   Provide modern avionics for  Two modified 
modernization)     China's F-8 fighters         F-8 fuselages,
                                                four avionics 
                                                kits, and
                                                related equipment

MK 46 Mod 2        Provide four torpedoes for   Four torpedoes 
torpedoes          test and evaluation          spares and related 
                   purposes with ultimate       test and maintenance   
                   deployment on Chinese        equipment
                   Navy ships and helicopters

Artillery locating Provide four AN/TPQ-37       Two AN/TPQ-37 radars,
radars             Firefinder counter-artillery including parts and         
                   radar systems                support equipment a

Large-caliber      Provide production           Miscellaneous            
artillery plant    capability for large-caliber components b
                   artillery munitions

a Two of these radars had been shipped before the sanctions.

b Major equipment was shipped prior to the sanctions.

Source: DOD.

These programs were in various states of completion when U.S.
sanctions were imposed. No new government-to-government
agreements have been opened since 1990. No open or unfulfilled
agreements are now pending between the U.S. government and China
under the Foreign Military Sales Program. The equipment ending
these programs was delivered to China

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between 1993 and 1995. It included four MK-46 Mod 2 torpedoes,
spare parts, maintenance, and test equipment. China's Navy was
to test the torpedoes for use on its ships and helicopters.

Commercial Exports of Munitions List Items

The Department of State has approved for export to China about
$313 million in Munitions List items since 1990. As shown in
table 3, $237 million of these exports involved launches of
U.S.-origin satellites from China.

Table 3: Approved U.S. Commercial Export License Applications
for Munitions List Equipment to China, January 1990-April 1998

Dollars in millions
Waiver requirement                 Munitions List items     Value

Approved export licenses for       Satellites and related   $237.0 
Munitions List items requiring a   equipment
presidential waiver for export to 
China                              Encryption for civil     $63.1
                                   applications or

Approved export licenses for items Munitions List equipment $12.7
exempted from U.S. sanctions       for inclusion in civil 
                                   products (e.g., inertial 
                                   navigation gear for civil
Total                                                       $312.8

Note: Values represent figures provided on the export
applications, not the value of actual shipments. In practice,
the value of actual exports is often less.

Source: U.S. Department of State.

The President determined that allowing these exports was in the
national interest. According to State officials, since 1990 11
presidential waivers have removed export restrictions on 21
satellite projects.9 Waivers were also granted to permit the
export of encryption equipment controlled on the Munitions List.
One case involved a $4.3-million communications export to
China's Air Force.

Since 1990, over $12 million in export licenses have been
approved for Munitions List equipment designed for inclusion in
civil products. These exports are not prohibited under U.S.
sanctions and therefore do not require a presidential waiver.
The majority of these exports involve navigational electronics
used in commercial airliners operated in China.

Between 1992 and 1996, control over exports of commercial
encryption equipment and commercial satellites was moved from
the Munitions List


9 Export licenses for many of these satellite projects were
issued by the Department of Commerce, rather than the Department
of State, and are therefore not included in table 3.

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to the Commerce Department's Commodity Control List. Since U.S.
sanctions restrict Munitions List exports and do not prohibit
the export of dual-use items, commercial encryption equipment
can now be exported to China without a presidential waiver.
U.S.-origin commercial satellites, however, though no longer on
the Munitions List, are covered by the law, and exports still
require a presidential waiver. 10

China's EU and U.S. Military Imports Could Help Address Some
Defense Needs

The small amount of EU and U.S. military item sales to China
since 1989 could help address some of China's defense needs.
However, their importance to China's modernization goal is
overshadowed by the much larger amounts of military equipment
provided by Russia and the Middle East. Moreover, before China
can fully exploit such items, it must overcome obstacles in its
military's command and control, training, and maintenance

Chinese Use of EU and U.S. Military Items

China has used French helicopters to reinforce its weak
antisubmarine warfare capabilities. According to open sources,
China has imported or built under license between 65 and 105
modern French turbine-powered helicopters, including about 40
after 1989. The helicopters include the SA-321 Super Frelon
(built as the Z-8) and the AS-365 Dauphin-2 (built as the Z-9).
China's Navy has adapted 25 of these helicopters to serve as its
antisubmarine warfare helicopter force and equipped some with
antisubmarine torpedoes. The Z-9 is carried aboard several
Chinese naval vessels. It has also been tested by China's Army
with ground-attack equipment, including antitank missiles.

According to experts, China's only effective ship-to-air missile
is the French Crotale missile system. China has deployed the
Crotale on four ships, including its two most modern
destroyers. 11~ Also, China has reverse-engineered the
Crotale--reducing China's dependence on foreign suppliers.
Similarly, China has reportedly reverse-engineered Italy's
Aspide air-to-air missile for use as a ship-to-air missile.

China's planned purchase of six to eight British Searchwater
airborne radar systems would provide China with some degree of
warning against


10 Other items moved from the Munitions List to Commerce
jurisdiction since 1990 include jet engine hot-section
technology, commercial global positioning system equipment, and
some night vision equipment. See our reports entitled Export
Controls: Issues in Removing Militarily Sensitive Items From the
Munitions List (GAO/NSIAD-93-67, May 31, 1993) and Export
Controls: Change in Export Licensing Jurisdiction for Two
Sensitive Dual-Use Items (GAO/NSIAD-97-24, Jan. 14, 1997).

11 These ships, however, still lack long-range, ship-to-air

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GAO/NSIAD-98-176 China


low-flying air attacks as well as help it direct fighter
aircraft, detect small vessels, and augment over-the-horizon
targeting. 112 China may mount the radars on converted Y-8

China could possibly use its four U.S. Mod 2 version MK-46
torpedoes to improve its copy of the Mod 1 version, which China
has already deployed on its French helicopters. In contrast with
the Mod 1, the early-1970s era Mod 2 has an improved computer
that provides a re-attack capability. The MK-46 torpedo's range
and speed exceed that of China's other western air-launched,
antisubmarine torpedo--the mid-1970s era Italian Whitehead
244S. 13

We do not know whether China has benefited from U.S. commercial
satellite transfers. State officials told us that export
licenses for satellite projects in China contain provisos
intended to minimize the risk of any unauthorized transfer of
sensitive technology. However, not all Commerce Department
licenses for exports of commercial satellites to China include
such provisos. Recent press reports have asserted that, despite
these controls, U.S. technology has been transferred to China
and has improved the reliability of China's missiles. We have
not evaluated the implementation of the security guidelines and
control procedures on satellite launches.

Russia and Middle East Provide Most of China's Modern Military

While these Eu and U.S. military items could be used to address
some defense needs, they constitute only a small part of the
range of military items that China has imported from foreign
suppliers since 1989. As shown in figure 1, total EU and U.S.
exports constituted less than 9 percent of the military items
imported by China during the embargoes' first 7 years.  Without
U.S. commercial satellites and encryption exports, this share
falls to less than 3.4 percent.

12 The United Kingdom has been reported as offering its Argus
airborne warning system to China, but China appears to have
chosen an Israeli system.

13 China acquired the Whitehead in the mid-1980s and has
deployed it on helicopters.

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Figure 1: Deliveries of Foreign Military Items to China, 1990-96

Russia/Soviet Union 71.8%
Middle East         17.0%
U.S. commercial      5.8%
Western Europe       2.3%
U.S. government      0.7%
Other                2.5% 

Total value: $5.3 billion (current-year dollars).

Note: The U.S. commercial share depicted above is based on the
value of export licenses granted since 1990, rather than on the
value of actual deliveries.

Sources: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; the
Departments of State and Defense.

Moreover, Russia and Israel have sold or agreed to sell to China
items that are far more lethal than those sold by EU members, as
well as items similar to those obtained from EU members. For
example, reported Russian agreements include

- two Sovremenniy destroyers, which are more modern than China's
domestically produced destroyers and which typically carry
advanced supersonic antiship missiles, ship-to-air missiles with
a much greater range than the Crotale, and antisubmarine
helicopters that are considerably larger than the Z-9

- about 50 Su-27 fighter aircraft--similar to U.S.  F-15s--armed
with potent air-to-air missiles and licensed Chinese Su-27

- about 25 Mi-17 transport assault helicopters; and

- four Kilo diesel electric submarines (including two of a very
quiet class that Russia has never before exported) and homing

Israel has helped China with its development of (1) the F-10
fighter aircraft (similar to the U.S. F-16) by providing
technology developed for the aborted Israeli Lavi fighter
project and (2) various missiles. It has also agreed to sell to
China its Phalcon airborne phased array surveillance

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radar, which, if fitted to a Russian airframe, would provide
China an airborne warning and command system.

China Faces Difficulties in Incorporating Modern Arms

According to experts, China will have to overcome several
persistent problems before it can effectively use its imported
arms to support its new military doctrine and help reinvigorate
its domestic defense industry.

China lacks command and control capabilities needed to
effectively integrate its armed forces in the fast-moving joint
offensive operations called for by its new doctrine. China's air
force units are hampered in their ability to communicate with
air defense, naval, and ground units. China also lacks a
reliable air defense intelligence system. While its future
airborne early warning systems will help address this problem,
China will still have to learn how to integrate such systems
into its air defense system. Experts informed us that military
systems integration remains a weakness for China.

China's acquisition of new and advanced military systems will
also test its training and maintenance processes. China may have
to significantly enhance the training, quality, and education
level of its military personnel to use increasingly advanced
equipment. Moreover, according to experts, China's Air Force has
not yet considered the training implications of its new
offensive joint operations doctrine. Chinese pilots fly fewer
hours than their western counterparts and tend to fly less
demanding training missions that do not emphasize joint
operations. Experts informed us that China's preference for
buying relatively small numbers of foreign military systems and
skimping on training and maintenance support packages reduces
opportunities for its military personnel to become familiar with
their new equipment and to augment China's weak maintenance

This practice of buying limited numbers of foreign systems may
reflect China's interest in obtaining foreign arms for
reverse-engineering purposes. China has long stressed its need
to become self-sufficient in weapons development and less
dependent on foreign suppliers. However, despite some successes,
China has had a mixed record in reverse-engineering foreign
systems. Its efforts to do so are hampered by an inefficient
defense sector and by the increasing complexity of modern
military systems.

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GAO/NSIAD-98-176 China



Recent U.S. executive branch actions suggest that its view of
China's human rights record--the original basis for the
embargo--may be changing. In light of these actions and the
possible weakening of support for the ~.u embargo by some
European governments, one question facing the United States
appears to be how it would respond if the Eu embargo were to
erode significantly in the future.

Agency Comments

DOD concurred with a draft of this report and provided written
technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate. The
Department of State provided oral comments and stated that the
draft report was just and reasonable. DOD'S written comments are
reprinted in their entirety in appendix II.

Scope and Methodology

To identify the terms of the Eu embargo and Eu military sales to
China, we interviewed officials and reviewed documents at F,u
offices in Washington, D.C., and Brussels, Belgium; foreign
and/or defense ministries in Belgium, France, Germany, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom; and the Departments of State and Defense
and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.  We also
contacted the governments of other Eu members regarding their
interpretation and implementation of the Eu embargo.

We obtained data on EU military sales to China from numerous
experts, including those at the National Defense University, the
Monterey Institute for International Studies' Center for
Non-Proliferation Studies, the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute, the Heritage Foundation, the RAND
Corporation, and the International Institute for Strategic
Studies. We based our depiction of Eu sales to China on data
developed by these experts and from a variety of public sources.

To identify the terms of the U.S. embargo and U.S. military sales
to China, we reviewed Public Law 101-246 and its legislative
history. We also interviewed officials and reviewed documents at
the Departments of Commerce, Defense, and State. We developed
our depiction of U.S. sales primarily from information taken
from databases at the Department of State's Office of Defense
Trade Controls and DOffs Defense Security Assistance Agency. We
did not validate the accuracy of these databases.

To identify the potential role of Eu and U.S. military items in
addressing Chinese defense needs, we consulted numerous experts,
including those at the National Defense University, the Monterey
Institute of International

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GAO/NSIAD-98-176 China


Studies' Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, the Heritage Foundation,
the RAND Corporation, and the International Institute for
Strategic Studies. We also attended symposiums on Chinese
security issues that were sponsored by the National Defense
University, the University of Maryland's Institute for Global
Chinese Affairs, and the American Enterprise Institute. We used
these experts' analyses of Chinese military requirements and
shortcomings as a framework for our assessments of the potential
role that EU military items could play in meeting Chinese
military needs.

To determine the magnitude and sources of China's post-1989 arms
imports, we drew on data from the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency's unclassified World Military Expenditures and
Arms Transfers database, which is based on delivery data.
Because this data significantly underreports U.S. deliveries, we
supplemented it with (1) U.S. government to government delivery
data obtained from the Defense Security Assistance Agency and
(2) commercial export licensing data obtained from the
Department of State's Office of Defense Trade Controls.

We are providing copies of this report to other congressional
committees and the Secretaries of State and Defense. Copies will
also be provided to others upon request.

Please contact me on (202) 512-4128 if you or your staff have
any questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this
report are listed in appendix III.

Sincerely yours,

Harold J. Johnson, Associate Director International Relations
and Trade Issues

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Appendix I

Description of Selected European Union Military Items Provided
to China, 1990-97

According to various public sources, European Union (~.u) member
states have delivered, or agreed to deliver, the following items
to China since 1989.

Naval Systems for the Luhu Destroyers

France has provided several systems for China's Luhu destroyers,
including the Crotale missile system. France first installed the
Crotale on its ships in the late 1970s. In 1982, it developed
the Crotale variant later provided to China. According to public
sources, the Crotale is a short-range (up to 13 kilometers),
ship-to-air point defense missile that can travel at more than
twice the speed of sound. The system also includes a missile
director, a missile launcher mounting, a fire control room with
supporting electronics, and a console in a combat information
center. The missile director uses a Castor radar and infrared
and television tracking systems.

Other French equipment on the Luhu destroyers includes the Sea
Tiger naval surveillance radar, the Dauphin-2 (Z-9) helicopter
(described later), and the TAVITAC combat data system (which is
used to integrate the Luhus' various onboard systems).

Dauphin-2 (Z-9) Helicopter

In 1980, France agreed to allow China to build the AS-365
Dauphin-2 in China as the Z-9 helicopter. The Chinese Navy has
equipped Dauphin-2s with sensors, torpedoes, and missiles for
use aboard its vessels. The Dauphin-2 is a medium-weight
multirole helicopter that is powered by two turbine engines.
Capable of carrying 11 passengers and 2 pilots, the Dauphin-2
has a top speed of 140 nautical miles per hour and a range of
410 nautical miles. Composite materials are used in its main and
rear rotor blades, and its tail rotor is built into the vertical

Super Frelon (Z-8) Helicopter

France delivered the SA-321 Super Frelon helicopter to China in
1977 and 1978 and agreed to allow China to build the Super
Frelon, under the designation of Z-8, in 1981. The Chinese Navy
has used Super Frelons for antisubmarine missions and has
equipped them with sensors, torpedoes, and antiship missiles. A
heavy shipboard helicopter that is powered by two turbine
engines, the Super Frelon has a top speed of 134 nautical miles
per hour and a range of 440 nautical miles. It can carry 27
fully armed troops or 39 unequipped troops.

GAO/NSIAD-98-176 China

Appendix I
Description of Selected European Union Military Items Provided
to China, 1990-97

Aspide Missile

According to a public source, Italy developed the Aspide from
the U.S.  Sparrow air-to-air missile and began producing it in
1977. The semi-active radar-guided Aspide has a top speed of
over twice the speed of sound and a range of about 7 nautical

Searchwater Airborne Early Warning Radar

The United Kingdom first deployed the Searchwater aboard its
Nimrod aircraft in 1979 and adapted it for use aboard Sea King
helicopters during its 1982 war with Argentina over the Falkland
Islands. It later developed the Skymaster version of the
Searchwater, which it subsequendy incorporated into the
Searchwater 2 system. According to a public source, the airborne
Skymaster uses an I-band transmitter that can operate in (1) a
pulse Doppler mode to provide look-down detection of airborne
targets and (2) a frequency agile conventional mode to detect
ships as well as aircraft flying above the Skymaster. When
operating at 10,000 feet, it is capable of detecting (1)
fighters and small boats below it at ranges of about 70 nautical
miles, (2) bombers flying below it about 100 nautical miles
away, and (3) larger vessels about 130 nautical miles away. The
radar can store and update data on 100 airborne and 32 surface
targets simultaneously.

F-7M/F-TMP Avionics

The United Kingdom and Italy have provided avionics for the F~TM
and MP fighters. The Soviet Union first allowed China to build
the F-7--a variation of the MiG-21--in 1961. China later
developed the M and MP versions for export to other nations,
including Pakistan. According to public sources, the United
Kingdom provided China with heads-up displays, weapon-aiming
computers, and fire control radars for the F-TM. Italy later
provided a new fire control radar for the F-TM and MP.

GAO/NSIAD-98-176 China
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