BILL CLINTON holding "IRIDIUM" satellite phone during 96 campaign



CIA, NSC, PRC AND S E X

SOFTWAR is pleased to announce an early Christmas package from those friendly folks who brought you George Tenet, Tony Lake and Roger Tamraz in the White House. The National Security Council (home of former Col. Oliver North) has surrendered to a SOFTWAR Freedom of Information request and sent us enough classified material to give my mail-person a hernia. As always this material will be reviewed and posted to our web site for you, the public, to read.

Normally, the NSC does not service FOIA requests. In fact, they have just won a Court case claiming that they are part of the White House and therefore, not subject to FOIA law. However, the NSC also has come under fire of late for allowing special interests to take control (e.g... the Roger Tamraz coffee taste test). The NSC sent a pile of SECRET, TOP SECRET, and TOP-SECRET-WITH-CODE-WORD documents from inside the Clinton White House that would put the Chicago phone book to shame. In addition, there are more black marks (censored) on this material than my kindergarten attendance record.

However, one thing has already jumped out of the pile and bit me on the nose. George Tenet's personal email. Seems that Mr. Tenet (now CIA Director Tenet) had a problem understanding encryption. Of course, Mr. Tenet had by this time taken or sent at least 7 memos, two in extreme detail from the FBI, on the subject. In short, Tenet was making policy over a technology he did not understand, a common problem in the Clinton administration.

Where there are questions one must seek answers. The well of wisdom Mr. Tenet sought for answers was Richard C. Barth, then Clinton's NSC Director of Nonproliferation and Export Controls. Yet, Tenet would have to ask quickly. Barth was at the same time preparing to leave the "most ethical" Clinton administration for greener pastures in business. I have attached below a short interchange of electronic memos where Mr. Tenet expressed his concern that "BARTHMAN" was leaving.

"Why are you leaving me?" Tenet asked Barth. "Do you want my job? my wife? My 1974 Camaro? This place will suck eggs without you to keep me sane."

Mr. Barth replied that HIS (Barth's) wife would be out of town the following week...

In an administration filled with Dick Morris sucking toes and Paula Jones giving a detailed description of the Presidential flag pole I am not prepared to pursue this line of inquiry. It's a safe assumption that Mr. Tenet and Mr. Barth were "close" friends but.... This is simply too much. No true blue American would give up his 1974 Camero!

One funny thing about Mr. Barth, though. Seems he had an extreme interest in export of encryption to China. On June 17, 1993 Barth wrote a secret memo covering export controls on encryption. Inside this memo he expressed his concerns that big bucks were at stake selling crypto behind the bamboo curtain.

"With the rapid decentralized growth of manufacturing in advanced telecommunications systems, other markets such as the PRC may be lost to US exporters due to export control restrictions," wrote Barth. "Recent evidence from AT&T seems to indicate that indigenous PRC production and availability of advanced switches from Israel are costing US exporters millions in lost sales."

Would it surprise you to find out that Richard Barth left the Clinton administration to work on encryption export issues for a major FORTUNE 500 Company with hundreds of millions of dollars at stake inside the PRC? Would it surprise you that Barth and Tenet also continued their "special" relationship?

I thought not...

Stay tuned for our next exciting episode of "The Clintons" titled: BARTHMAN RETURNS or Guess Who's Coming To Dinner With Jiang Zemin?


BARTHMAN RETURNS or Guess Who's Coming To Dinner With Jiang Zemin?

In our last episode Richard C. Barth, National Security Council Proliferation Director for President Clinton, had just received the following email from George Tenet, the current Director of the CIA.

"BARTHMAN," wrote Tenet in June 1993. "Why are you leaving me? Do you want my job, my wife, my 1974 camero?"

Despite the generous offer of George Tenet, "Barthman" left the NSC to take a job in business. Ah, but that business would again bring him into contact with his old pal who had a passion for fast cars. On March 22, 1995, Mr. Barth would cc a fax message to some of his old buddies inside government, including, George Tenet at the NSC and Sue Eckert at the Commerce Department.

What did Barth want? It wasn't a chevy muscle car... He was requesting a special waiver for EXPORTS OF ENCRYPTED RADIOS TO CHINA.

"Such a waiver would not reduce NSA's oversight over all encryption containing exports to China," noted Mr. Barth in the fax addressed to Tenet. "Current controls remain, only the need to NOTIFY CONGRESS of each sale is removed."

Further, in an attached letter addressed to the State Department, dated November 23, 1994, Mr. Barth wrote "This is to request that your office initiate action to obtain a waiver from requirements for individual export license notifications to Congress for wireless mobile communications systems containing encryption for China. Such a waiver was issued by the President in September of this year for civilian satellite systems and encrypted products for use by American firms operating in China."

So, "Barthman" wanted the newly elected Republican Congress to be kept in the dark. To put it simply. I want to export but let's keep the deal between you, me and the PRC. No need to let the Republican Congress know about all the messy details on ciphered radios going to communist China. I mean there's national security, political security and then there's liquid $ecurity. And this deal was so liquid you could fill an Olympic sized pool with the cash.

"We currently have about $100 million worth of two way radio business tied up by the lack of a waiver for China and face losing a market of about $500 million," stated Barth on the monetary impact of his proposal.

Just how connected was Barth? One of the attached letters from Barth that I noted above, a memo written to the State Department, clearly displays that some civilians (unlike this author) can get the NSA to talk about the "intelligence" business.

"European firms," wrote Barth. "Have for a number of months been able to market and sell encryption in China as a result of a decision taken by the UK intelligence agency, GCHQ. I understand that our National Security Agency is aware of this change in GCHQ's position and would support our request for a change in US requirements for export licenses for China. The NSA has AGREED that there should be a 'level playing field' in regard to China."

I find it interesting indeed that an agency known for keeping its mouth shut would spill their guts to an ex-NSC member now employed in the commercial sector. How did Mr. Barth know British GCHQ had changed its position? Who in the NSA told him there should be a "level playing field" for export to China? It would be fun to find out how Mr. Barth, who was nearly two years out of government employ, obtained this data for his company but alas... Mr. Barth has so far declined to be interviewed. Still, Mr. Barth's fax was not your ordinary appeal for a special waiver.

"Finally, while we now are not yet applying for licenses for ENCRYPTED SYSTEMS FOR SATELLITE POSITIONING, we may within months be applying for such licenses for our IRIDIUM systems."

For those of you who "just don't get it" please note - The only way to control satellites is with secure radio communications. Encryption is used to scramble commands sent to satellites to move, or change functions. Without crypto your average satellite is nothing more than a remote computer, waiting to be hacked (eg.. Captain Midnight hack of HBO). However, what can be applied to a satellite in space can also be applied to a atomic bomb. Without crypto your average nuclear missile warhead is nothing more than a remote computer, waiting to be hacked.

Is Barth's company in the satellite business with China?

Motorola owns a good sized chunk of Iridium, a global communications satellite business, and so does China Great Wall Industries. Motorola invented Iridium, builds the phones and even parts of the satellites. Of course, Great Wall has used their Long March rocket to put some of the Iridium satellites into orbit (and was paid very well to do it). The system can best be described as cell phones in space. No need for a cell tower to be in range if your phone is talking to an Iridium satellite overhead. Perfecto place for world wide "secure" communications. If you would like to see an Iridium phone you can view it in Bill Clinton's hands at my web site. There is a real neato photo of Bill at a Motorola Iridium factory from the 1996 campaign.

And Barthman? Richard Barth currently works for Motorola as Assistant Director for International Trade Relations. He joins an impressive crew of former Clinton administration officials working for Motorola or Iridium, including Laura Fitz Pedgado. Ms. Pedgado was Ron Brown's close assistant at Commerce. Ms. Pedgado admitted under oath to JUDICIAL WATCH that she has zero knowledge about satellites but she still pulls down six figures from Iridium. You can read all about Motorola, China, IRIDIUM, Laura and the cozy satellite deal in Tim Maier's excellent piece that appeared in INSIGHT magazine 'COMMERCE-IAL' ESPIONAGE?

Other little known facts about Motorola and the Clinton administration:

The current Commerce Department Bureau of Export Affairs top legal counsel, a Mr. Zia, is an ex-Motorola employee who specialized in cellular and radio exports to Asia. Zia is himself a former DNC fund-raiser who worked with John Huang, Melinda Yee and Charlie Trie.

Motorola's CEO flew with Ron Brown in November of 1994 to an Asia trade conference to Indonesia.

Motorola sent Mr. Hu Welleng, Executive Director and VP of Motorola-Asia, from Hong Kong to have coffee in the White House on Jan. 16, 1996 with Bill Clinton, Al Gore, Don Fowler Harold Ickes and Thomas McLarty.

And if coffee in the White House was not enough...

The CEO of Motorola attended the recent official White House state dinner for PRC President Jiang Zemin with Al Gore and Bill Clinton.


George Tenet Makes An Offer In Email.


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 29-Jun-1993 9:23 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard C. Barth (BARTH)

FROM: George J. Tenet (TENET)

SUBJECT: PAPERS FOR PRINCIPALS

CC: Records (RECORDS)

BARTHMAN:

Can you shoot me a copy of the paper going to principals regarding telecommunications sales and the Russkies. I have some equities in this fight and should be up to speed, particularly with your departure being as imminent as it is. When can I take you to lunch by the way? When can you spare an hour to debrief me on exports/encryption? Why are you leaving me? Do you want my job? my wife? My 1974 Camaro? This place will suck eggs without you to keep me sane.

GJT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 01-Jul-1993 9:23 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR: George J. Tenet (TENET)

FROM: Richard C. Barth (BARTH)

SUBJECT: meeting, etc.

I'd be happy to brief you up on the export control stuff.

My wife is out of town next week and my schedule is therefore more open. Let's set something up on Tuesday after the holiday.

Thanks

CC: Records (RECORDS)


NSC Richard Barth SECRET Paper on Crypto.
SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D C 20506

JUNE 17, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR             JAMES LEWIS
                           Department of State

                           GEOFFREY GREIVELDINGER
                           Department of Justice

                           PETER SULLIVAN
                           Department of Defense

                           SUE ECKERT
                           Department of Commerce

                           ARNOLD DONOHUE
                           Office of Management and Budget

                           ROBERT KYLE
                           National Economic Council

                           GEORGE TENET
                           National Security Council

                           XXX NAME BLACKED OUT XXX
                           Central Intelligence Agency

                           JOHN O'NEIL
                           Office of Science and Technology Policy

                           ALAN MCDONALD
                           Federal Bureau of Investigation

                           XXX NAME BLACKED OUT XXX
                           National Security Agency

SUBJECT: Sub-IWG Meeting on Encryption Export Controls (U)

There will be a meeting of the sub-IWG on encryption export control on Tuesday, June 22, 1993, from 2:00 - 3:00 p.m. for principals plus one in Room 208 of the OEOB. Please phone in the names and dates of birth of your attendees to Marion Blieberger at 202-395-3550 not later than COB June 21. (U)

The meeting will be to discuss the attached synopsis of the papers submitted by agencies in response to the PRD on encryption and advanced telecommunications. In addition, we will need to have status reports on the briefing on the effectiveness of export controls XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX BLACKED OUT AS STILL SECRET XXXXX (S)

Richard Barth
Director, Nonproliferation
and Export Controls

Attachment


SECRET


SECRET

EXPORT CONTROLS ON ENCRYPTION
AND ADVANCED TELECOMMUNICATIONS

Background

The PDD on Advanced Telecommunications and Encryption required an assessment of the impact of export controls on these technologies. Agencies provided the attached analyses:

Tab I    Impact of Advanced Telecommunications Export Controls
         on Industry

Tab II   Impact of Encryption Export Controls on Industry

Tab III  Impact of Advanced Telecommunications Export Controls
         on National Security

Tab IV   Impact of Encryption Export Controls on National
         Security (U)

(Not attached for purposes of circulating to sub-IWG) (U)

Additional information on the practices of foreign governments to control the export of encryption and advanced telecommunications technologies will be provided after NSA briefs members of the export control sub-IWG. (U)

The following seeks to summarize the results of the analyses at Tabs I-IV at the Secret level in a Q&A format consistent with the PDD. (U)

Assessment

1. Do export controls have an impact on these industry sectors and is that impact quantifiable? (U)

For advanced telecommunications, export controls seem to impose a direct and to some extent measurable cost of lost business to US exporters. Those lost sales opportunities are easiest to quantify with respect to end-users, such as Iran, which are unilaterally proscribed for the export of controlled items by virtue of legislation or policy. Losses to US exporters range in the hundreds of millions of dollars in sales. In addition, with rapid decentralized growth of manufacturing in advanced telecommunications systems, other markets such as the PRC may be lost to US exporters due to export control restriction. Recent evidence from AT&T seems to indicate that indigenous PRC

SECRET Declassify on: OADR


SECRET


production and availability of advanced switches from Israel are costing US exporters millions in lost sales. (U)

For encryption technologies, the amount of lost global market share is more difficult to assess. However, industry data indicate that at least some market share is indeed lost due to very tight encryption export restrictions, which are administered as munitions export controls by the State Department with NSA having a virtual veto over export license approvals. Data provided by industry indicates that while there may not be significant trans-national export of encryption technologies, US exporters are prohibited from competing in, say, the UK, where domestic producers have carved out the most significant market share. The same holds true for most other industrialized nations. The result of this trend is that the global interoperability of computer and telecommunications networks with encryption is constrained, and global growth in markets, particularly for software, are limited artificially. Long term, industry believes that we risk handing over to competitors in other countries a market in which the US now dominates as long as encryption features are only demanded by few end-users. Industry's inability to compete as encryption becomes a standard software feature will result in the loss of significant market share. (U)

Industry is very concerned that export control policies established for the key escrow algorithm, if as restrictive as for the currently widely available DES, will foreclose exports of items - software, technology or products - containing this technology. That is not of significant concern if the domestic market for key escrow technologies fails to grow. If the domestic demand is significant, however, industry will be faced with developing export and domestic versions of their products at significant cost and with limited domestic and foreign interoperability. Industry recommends that if the USG wishes to establish key escrow technologies in the global marketplace, the only practicable way of doing that is to remove export controls on key escrow technology. (U)

2. Do export controls have an impact on national security and is that impact quantifiable? (U)

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX  INFORMATION WITH-HELD IN THE  XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX  INTEREST OF NATIONAL SECURITY  XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

SECRET



Motorola Richard Barth Seeks Waiver For China Crypto.

(*** transcribers note *** hand written CC at top)

                                                    CC: GEORGE
                                                        BXXXXX
                                                        ED

MOTOROLA

FAX COVER SHEET

1350 I STREET N.W.
SUITE 400
WASHINGTON, DC 20005
OFFICE Number: 202-371-6900
FAX Number: 202-842-3578

To:      Sue Eckert                 482-3911
         Charlotte Kuepper          301-688-8183
         Julie Kavanaugh            647-4232
         George Tenet               456-9340
         Ron Lee                    301-688-4546

From:    Richard Barth
         Motorola - Washington, DC

Re: See attached

You should receive 6 pages including this cover sheet. If you do not receive all the pages, please contact Shannon Ibey on 202 371-6919.

================================================================
Check appropriate POPI classification of information being sent:

Motorola General Business Information __X__
Motorola Internal Use Only _____
Motorola Confidential Proprietary _____

Pages: 6 (including cover sheet)

March 22, 1995

Note for Julie Kavanaugh
         Charlotte Knepper

Please forgive the informality of this note, but I want to move the process along here and not stand on formalities. As you can see for the attached, Motorola has been trying to clarify the policy regarding sales to China of telecom systems containing encryption for several months now. We currently have about $100 million worth of two way radio business tied up by the lack of a waiver for China and face losing a market of about $500 million in GSM infrastructure sales alone over the next five years if we cannot sell systems that GCHQ in the UK has already approved last summer for export from Europe. On top of that are hundreds of millions worth of cellular phone sales that could be lost.

You requested a brief summary of why Motorola was requesting broad waiver authority. First, such a waiver would not reduce NSA's oversight over all encryption containing exports to China. Current controls remain, only the need to notify Congress of each sale is removed.

Second, we only request a level playing field. This does not now exist when our key competition, Erisson, Siemens, Alcatel, etc., are able to sell two way radios, cellular and PCS systems to China and we are denied that ability by current US policy.

Third, as you well know, this technology is not standing still. While we NOW are only at risk of losing perhaps a billion worth of sales, the future systems that may be announced in a month or a year or more may require going back for a new waiver. Why waste all that time applying for waivers for that which is in the US Government's best interest.

Finally, while we now are not yet applying for licenses for encrypted systems for satellite system positioning, we may within months be applying for such licenses for our Iridium systems.

The bottom line is that getting a waiver through the system today, as we requested on November 23, 1994, for "all commercial cellular, PCS (personal communications systems) and other telecommunications systemhardware and software," is realistic and appropriate for today's markets and those in the immediate future. However, we are getting quite anxious about getting this waiver through asap because of the risk of lost business, so if this request for the broadest possible waiver will further slow down the process, I urge you to get in writing to the State Department asap language that seeks a waiver for "cellular, PCS and two way radio systems," as recently agreed. Then we can start all over again for the additional waiver coverage...

Thanks and please call me if there are any further data I can provide.

Rich Barth
Assistant Director, International Trade Relations

cc:      Sue Eckert
         George Tenet
         Ron Lee

(***  transcriber's note ***  the following is hand written)
Charlotte/Julie

I hope this can be
moved more quickly now.

Rich

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

DECEMBER 2, 1994

Dr. Richard C. Barth
Assistant Director, International Trade Relations
Government Relations Division
Motorola
1350 I Street, N.W., Suite 400
Washington, DC 2005-3305

Dear Dr. Barth:

I am replying to your letter of November 23, in which you requested that my office initiate action to obtain a waiver of the requirement for individual export license notifications to Congress for exports to China of wireless mobile communications systems containing encryption.

As you know, there are important issues that must be considered carefully, in light of the post-Tiananmen sanctions. The President recently renewed the Administration's commitment to these sanctions when he de-linked MFN and human rights issues. Government policies regarding exports of US Munitions List items are covered by these Congressionally mandated sanctions. We shall of course take into account the new information you have provided regarding the recent decision in Europe to allow the export of A5-2 encrypted GSM cellular systems as we continue to review our policies toward China.

We have begun consulting within State and with other concerned agencies on various aspects of this issue. We may need to contact you for additional information as we continue these consultations.

If you wish to have further discussions on the issue, I suggest that you contact Dr. Martha Harris, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State who is directly responsible for our work in this area. Dr. Harris can be contacted here in the Bureau of Political-Military affairs at (202) 647-6977 (FAX: (202) 647-4232). Alternatively, you may contact Cesare Rosati, the action officer in the Bureau for encryption policy, at (202) 647-0397 (FAX: (202) 647-4232).

Sincerely,

Thomas E. McNamara


MOTOROLA


NOVEMBER 23, 1994

Theodore McNamara
Assistant Secretary of State
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
Department of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Mr. McNamara:

This is to request that your office initiate action to obtain a waiver from requirement for individual export license notifications to Congress for wireless mobile communications systems containing encryption for China. Such a waiver was issued by the President in September of this year for civilian satellite systems and encrypted products for use by American firms operating in China.

The commercial/consumer telecommunications industry has become a truly global arena, and China represents a large potential market. The major suppliers of wireless systems, offering comparable or identical technologies, are engaged in a constant struggle to capture and retain market share. Currently, US companies are at a significant competitive disadvantage in the marketing and selling of digital communications systems with encryption in China because our competitors are allowed to market and sell such systems while US manufacturers are prohibited from doing so.

The cellular phone market highlights the problem that also exists for other telecommunications providers. European firms, including Nokia, Ericsson, Alcatel and Siemens, have for a number of months been able to market and sell GSM cellular systems with A5-2 encryption in China as a result of a decision taken by the UK intelligence agency, GCHQ. I understand that our National Security Agency is aware of this change in GCHQ's position and would support our request for a change in US requirements for export licenses for China. The NSA has agreed that there should be a "level playing field" in regard to China and would concur with allowing US firms to supply A5-2 GSM systems to that market.

All such export transactions in China involving encryption would continue to be subject to the usual strict compliance requirements of the State Department's ITAR regulations, and NSA would continue their participation in the license review process. The only change we are requesting is for the requirement for Congressional notification for each and every export of these technologies.

We request waiver authority for "all commercial cellular, PCS (personal communications systems) and other telecommunications system hardware and software."

Please let me know if I can provide further information on this subject. Because of the competitive disadvantage suffered by Motorola under the current export control constraints, I request your urgent attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

Richard C. Barth, PhD.
Assistant Director, International Trade Relations

cc:      Assistant Secretary Dan Tarullo
         Deputy Assistant Secretary Martha Harris
         Lou Giles
         Bill Clements
         Will Lowell
         Karen Hopkinson
         Ray Mislock

Special Friends Of Rich

Mr. Richard Barth has a special relationship with the current CIA Director George Tenet. Mr. Barth's story is typical of the Washington musical chairs game of bureaucrat to politician to lobbyist and back again. In 1991 Mr. Barth was writing TOP SECRET encryption papers inside the conservative Republican Bush White House for the National Security Council. Barth is the perfect bureaucrat because little things like ideology and politics have had no effect on his career. When Clinton was elected in 1992 Mr. Barth made a smooth transition into a liberal Democratic White House. Still, by July of 1993, Barth would leave the Clintons for a much higher paying job at Motorola.

However, Barth's real job seemed to be maintaining the inside contacts at the White House. On Aug. 16, 1993, George Tenet wrote an email to another NSC member, William Clements, titled "export issues and encryption". Inside this email Tenet would write about the ex-NSC member Barth and how much he was needed.

"I had previously asked Barth to get Commerce to provide us with a dispassionate assessment of the world's encryption market place. I called him. He says he is seeing a woman tonight who should know where this study is. In addition, we had tasked CIA to study the issue as well. They have a paper in draft which will be coming along shortly.... I am trying to set up a meeting with you, barth and myself in the next day or two."

And on Aug. 17, 1993, David Kelly of the NSC would also write to William Clements about Barth.

"George Tenet and I would like to review the bidding on the export policy aspects of the encryption issue with you and Rich Barth. Are you available to get together in George's office at 9:00 tomorrow, following the weekly status meeting? I've contacted Rich and will clear him into the building."

Funny, how someone who had already been inside the White House since 1991 had to be "cleared" again. That is, of course, unless he no longer worked for the White House.

On Aug. 18, 1993, George Tenet would write up the results of the 9:00 meeting, titled "Next Steps on Encryption". Tenet wrote "I am baffled by Ray Kammer's announcement that someone has to ask RON BROWN to be a key escrow holder.... Ray Kammer has been asked to put together a status report... Please ensure that Clements and Barth have provided a thoughtful export piece for Kammer."

How extraordinary. Motorola's Barth writing policy for the Clinton administration - after he had left government service. And the comments about Ron Brown's involvement in Clipper clearly document the Commerce Secretary was indeed very interested in the overt attempt to install the "exploitable" CLIPPER chip inside every phone, fax and computer. Of course, Mr. Brown would later wine and dine Motorola's CEO in a 1994 trip to of all places ... Indonesia.

Right after Motorola's CEO took that trip... Barth would appeal to his old friends at the Clinton White House to allow his new boss (Motorola) to sell encrypted systems to China. Barth's appeal was based a personal quote from the National Security Agency for a "level playing field". Motorola got their deal alright... Over one hundred million dollars in a single sale to China and the potential for another five hundred million. Of course, some of the profits were cycled back to the Clinton campaign in the form of SOFT money. FYI - Motorola donated over $900,000 to the DNC soft money coffers in 1996 alone.

Could the lack of coffee money make a difference?

Many other American companies were not given such extraordinary treatment. It is not a level playing field for them. They still cannot export. In fact, exporting any crypto (hardware or software) can bring criminal charges. For example, while Motorola was building and shipping encrypted radios to China - Janet Reno and the Department of Justice would prosecute Phil Zimmerman and block Dr. Bernstein using the "grey" areas of the export law.

The entire affair seems like nothing more than a series of meetings by the same people who on occasion exchange titles. The Government choose to restrict everyone else while allowing a more favored friend to pass. It is possible to bend the law for personal gain if one has the influence. It is also possible for the Government to prosecute one person while allowing another to pass. What is a felony for one becomes just another hundred million dollar deal to another. To quote Arnaud DeBourgrave "the horse ran out of the barn... THEN CLINTON locked the barn door."

We have been kept in the dark and something certainly smells.